Different authors show opposing results concerning the relationship between national and European identities. This article confirms empirically that identification with Europe is directly and yet paradoxically related to national identifications. It also shows that the relationship established between these two identifications has changed over the last two decades in a consistent way. The changes in this relationship are interpreted as a consequence of the dual process at stake when people identify with a territorially based community. The first process refers to the sociologically and politically determined individual disposition to feel like a member of a community rather than an isolated individual: it is cumulative as far as identification with nations and with Europe is concerned. The other dimension, on the contrary, is exclusive: it results from the sociological and political process of community building which is made easier by the delimitation of the community, and is hence fuelled by pointing out some significant "other" such as the European Union. These two processes interact in such a way that the relationship between the two levels of identification is often difficult to spot which explains why there is considerable debate on whether a strong sense of national identity leads the way to European identity or prevents it. For a long time, support for European integration could be analyzed without much reference to the attachments of European citizens to their nations. Beyond the recurring acknowledgement of a strong social determination in attitudes towards Europe, analysts did
For a long time, support for European integration could be analyzed without much reference to the attachments of European citizens to their nations. Beyond the recurring acknowledgement of a strong social determination in attitudes towards Europe, analysts did observe important differences in support among European countries, but these were considered as encompassing all sorts of differences in the countries themselves. There was no need to infer major differences in the ways the different peoples of Europe related to their own country.
Nowadays, most European Union analysts consider that the growing process of European integration has changed the very nature of attitudes towards Europe. From 1994 onwards and the establishing of European citizenship, it has been argued that support for the European Union should be analyzed as a European identity-building process rather than as a set of tolerant attitudes towards a remote and foreign object as used to be the case. Hence, the question of the relationship between support for the European Union and the commitment of European citizens to their own country can no longer be avoided (Diez Medrano 2003) . This article will examine the changing relationship between national and European commitment since 1982. This relationship will in turn be apprehended through the notions of national identification and identification with Europe.
Concepts and definitions
The notion of identity has been deeply criticized in political science 2 because of the diversity of meanings and uses (Brubaker & Cooper 2000) associated with it. However, as
suggested by the work of Charles Tilly, it is undoubtedly preferable to "get identity right" and to remember that "identities are social arrangements", and consequential ones, resulting from collective negotiations about who people are (Tilly 2003, p. 608) rather than renouncing the notion. At a collective level, identity -and in this case national identity -can thus be considered as a complex pattern of meanings and values related to the group whose borders are defined by the state's capacity to intervene and which underlies the varied representations and attitudes of the citizens towards each other and towards others (Duchesne, 2003) . At an individual level, identity is taken to be a continuous (re)combination of different identifications, that is, of changing but relatively persistent patterns of references to potential groups of belonging (Duchesne & Scherrer 2003) . The notion of identification used in this text represents the link between an individual and the other members of one of his/her many potential groups of reference. Individuals identify with different groups and, while they therefore have different identifications, they have only one identity which may change to a certain extent over time but which is considered to be basically stable. So the notion of identification with the nation or with Europe only refers to whether somebody does in fact feel related to the national or European people, whether they feel concerned by what happens to them, and whether they feel themselves to be part of this citizenry. An individual's identity combines national and European identification with many other possible identifications with groups defined on varied bases such as gender, generation, race, social class, language, geography, ideology, interests, etc.
The focus here will be restricted to the way in which identification with the nation and with Europe relate to each other. A similar point -the observation that an individual identity is the combination of belonging to diverse groups -is made by most analysts of what they nevertheless call European identity (see for example Castano 2004 or Bruter 2005 . The choice has been made here to differentiate between identity and identification for conceptual clarity. The distinction is important as the term identification includes the idea that existing senses of belonging at both national and European level will/may change in the middle-term.
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The notion of consistent feelings of belonging 3 is relevant when referring to nations as they are old enough for this to the case. However,, the EU is probably still too young to have aroused deep and consistent feelings of belonging among the majority of its citizens. Writing about European identity may be misleading; identification with Europe rightly emphasizes that it is the process itself which is under discussion here.
Current Alternative Hypotheses
Different hypotheses may be considered regarding how the relationship between national and European identification may develop over time. Generally speaking, the old dream of the EU founding fathers was to see citizens identify more and more with Europe and eventually cease to identify with their own nations -a transfer of attachment which was expected to ward off the nationalist conflicts and wars which have cast a shadow over the continent for several centuries. For the time being, this dream has been proved to be partly inaccurate as revealed by a revival of nationalism in conflicts following the collapse of the Soviet Empire in Eastern and Central Europe, or the long-standing electoral success of nationalist parties in Western Europe. However, there exist at least three alternative hypotheses on the way identification with Europe is increasing in a context of persistently strong national identifications.
Firstly, some scholars believe that the European Union has marked the start of a new kind of political system which is free from any kind of exclusive commitment on the part of its citizens -be it because of the development of a basic global solidarity or because of the transformation of political decision systems from governments to multi-level governance (Meehan 1996; Wiener 1998; Ferry 1998; Neveu 2000; Habermas 2001; Nicolaidis & Weatherill 2003 Or, on the other hand, Europe is seen rather as a complement to the nations, an empowerment. Nations thus constitute a kind of model, an incentive framework of 'wefeeling' which encourages citizens to feel and act as members of a political community (Duchesne & Frognier 94, 02; Schild 2001 , Citrin & Sides 2004 Diez-Medrano 03; Bruter 05) . In this latter case, one would expect a positive and significant statistical relationship between indicators of European and national identities (hypothesis three).
As the references cited indicate, these three hypotheses are indeed supported by existing literature. The first hypothesis is mainly discussed from a theoretical point of view, but empirical evidence is provided for the other two. This means that researchers using empirical halshs-00841702, version 1 -5 Jul 2013 data have proved that national and European identifications tend to be both antagonist and cumulative. Although they focus on support for European integration rather than on identification with Europe, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks draw a similar conclusion concerning the effect of national feelings: "The paradox that we identified earlier is apparent:
national identity contributes to and diminishes support for European integration" (Hooghe & Marks 2004, p.417) They suggest that this is due to the various ways national identity may be constructed and mobilized by political elites. The aim of this paper is first to confirm and then complement their interpretation of this apparent paradox. The data clearly demonstrate that when someone says they are very proud of their nationality, they are not less likely to feel European. In 1982, in the few cases where Kendall's tau-b is statistically significant -Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy and Luxemburg -the relationship is such that the more someone says that they are proud of their country, the more often they are likely to think of themselves as European also (see also Duchesne & Frognier 1994) .
Indicators and Methodology
In 1992, the indicator of identification with Europe changed. The old and the new questions (whether people feel not only national but also European and whether they see themselves as national and/or European in the near future) were asked in the same survey, but not the question on national pride. Therefore, the impact of the change of question on the measure of the relationship between national and European identification cannot be evaluated.
However, in 1994 the interviewees were asked again both about national pride and the likelihood of their feeling European, using the new indicator. A significant negative relationship shows up in most of the countries studied (except for Greece, Ireland and Portugal) 9 .
In 1997, a first quick look at the data confirms the antagonism trend: on the whole, in the weighted dataset, 54 % of the people saying that they there are very proud of their nation see themselves as only national in the near future, with only 43 % of the people saying that they are rather proud, and 38 and 40% of those that are not very or not proud at all. But a closer look at the data set shows that this relationship is not stable from one country to the other. In the two-thirds of countries where the correlation is negative, it is fully significant only in France, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Sweden and West Germany. Moreover, in five other countries, namely Belgium, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Portugal, the relationship is Perhaps more importantly, the relationship became more varied across countries. It is fully significant in eight cases out of seventeen -mainly the same as in 1997 (West Germany, European -to be rather independent from one another. Moreover, considering that the question on identification with Europe implies an antagonism between the two levels, the two identifications could thus even be considered slightly cumulative. However, when public debate focuses on the EC because of European elections, ratification of treaties or indeed the introduction of the Euro, strong national pride seems to hamper the growth of identification with Europe. As Europe evolves from a remote and administrative loosely identified object to a concrete and political system, this second configuration tends to be the norm. However, another interpretation might be suggested here. Rather than being a result of the strong influence of elites on attitudes which are essentially weak, it could be seen as a consequence of the complexity of identification processes. In the next section, further evidence of this complexity will be given by looking at other indicators of relationships to Europe and the nation, and by suggesting a possible explanation: the duality of territorial identification. halshs-00841702, version 1 -5 Jul 2013
National or European Identification: Different Processes at Stake
Since Autumn 2000, the Eurobarometer surveys have also asked people about the extent to which they feel proud of being European, and clearly, except in the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and Greece, being proud of one's nation is far from being incompatible with being proud of being European (see table 2 ). In all four surveys more than 80% of the people on average who say they are very proud of being European also answer that they are very proud of their nation. About two thirds of the respondents indicating that they are very proud of their country are also very or fairly proud of being European. Great Britain and Northern
Ireland are the only places where the majority of respondents who say that they are very proud of their country also say that they are not proud of being European.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
It is difficult to understand why, using the same dataset over the same time period, there is evidence of a negative relationship between national pride and European identification for almost every country, except the UK and Greece, even though national and European pride are clearly positively related. How can a relationship appear to be so highly dependent on the way it is measured and yet be so consistent in the way it changed over the last two decades?
The following explanation seems the most likely. The strength of the contextual effect on the changing relationship between national pride as well as the powerful effect of the different measures of identification with Europe are a consequence of the duality of the relationship between national and European identification. This duality is basically a characteristic of the very notion of territorial identification itself. To identify oneself with one's nation or any other group defined by a territory implies two different processes. First, it assumes a natural tendency to identify with a group. Secondly, it implies the propensity to identify with the specific group defined by this specific territory. At the European level, these two processes of identification may generate contradictory relationships with former national identification: the two levels are generally cumulative when the tendency to identify with a group is concerned; and potentially competitive when the disposition to identify with a specific territorial community is at stake. When observed with aggregated data, the interference between these two processes gives rise, to the paradoxical statistical relationship between measures of identification with the nation and with Europe.
The first process -the natural tendency to identify with a group -is challenged by the growing individualism of modern societies. Norbert Elias (1991) has shown how the recurrent shift of the social survival unit from the very local to the nation, then to the continent and perhaps even mankind, has resulted in a growing level of individualism. However, the last two decades have shown that the nation, however abstract or constructed it may be, still generates strong feelings of belonging. It seems to remain a very effective source of group identification, of self-representation as a group member, which fuels we-feelings in other groups, especially in other territories which have an embedded relationship with the nation. In this process of 'we-building', national and European identifications are cumulative: both geographers and political scientists refer to them as "nested" identities (Herb & Kaplan 1999; Risse 2003; Medrano & Gutiérrez 2001 ).
The second process, which implies the propensity to identify with the specific group defined by a specific territory, involves the delimitation of the group as a strong constituent of group identification. Since Fredrik Barth's (1969) pioneer work on ethnic identities, the process of 'other-building' has been considered to be a basic characteristic of any kind of identity and a well-documented element in the analysis of nation and nationalism, as in Let us return briefly to the introduction and the three hypotheses found in the literature as mentioned above: how does the interpretation above fit into that framework? Hypothesis one is ruled out by the empirical evidence of a persistent, although complex, statistical relationship between the indicators of national and European attachment. 15 Hypotheses two and three actually both correspond to the two processes of identification. Depending on the way elites and the mass media interpret and advertise the European system in progress, European citizens will tend to expect either an encompassing polity aiming to complement
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and empower nations or a powerful political system competing with them for sovereignty.
The first process -where identifying with Europe means tending to have a 'we-feeling' -is not so much taken into consideration by the literature which it undoubtedly should be. 
Empirical evidence of the dual processes at stake in the identification with Europe
It would be appropriate at this point to provide some evidence of the duality of the identification process with Europe. In order to do this, a factor analysis of all the sets of variables in the dataset which refer to territorial identification was computed. Both the 
CHART 2 ABOUT HERE
The factor analysis is a principal component one 17 here with normalization of variables.
Chart 2 exhibits the first two factors extracting 59,98% of the variance 18 . The circle is the circle of correlations (equal to one): the nearer the variables are to this circle, the more their inter-correlations become statistically significant. Data values on the graph come from Table 3 .
halshs-00841702, version 1 -5 Jul 2013 The first factor explains a little more than one third of the variance. It gathers strong and positive contributions from all the measures of attachment and pride (with loadings contributing slightly more to the factor for the national and sub-national entities).
Euronational, which is the only indicator that records a choice between levels of identification, is also the only variable that barely loads on the first factor. The second factor contains strong positive contributions from the questions concerning Europe and negative (although less strong) contributions from all other questions. When the same analysis is carried out at the country level, the results are very similar. The same first two factors appear in the analysis of all countries. The interpretation of these two factors is quite straightforward.
The first factor refers to the cumulative dimension of national and European identification, the social desire to belong to any available territorial group, while the second relates back to the exclusive dimension, to the potentially politically constructed antagonism between two political systems, the European and the traditional ones (nation and sub-national entities), competing for legitimacy. However, this competition seems a little less marked between Europe and nation, than between Europe and local entities 19 .
The problem with this kind of analysis and indeed this kind of charts, is that it postulates a linear relationship between the items of each question. In order to check this, a second factor analysis was carried out, a so called "correspondence factor analysis", which deals with items instead of variables. With correspondence analyses, two items are close if they represent answers given by the same or similar respondents, that is, respondents who
give similar answers to the other questions taken into account in the same analysis (Lebart et alii, 2006) .
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Chart 3 displays the first two dimensions. With correspondence analysis, the points' coordinates do not necessarily indicate their relative weight. The way items contribute to each dimension is indicated as follows: with (1) if they clearly contribute to the first factor, with (2) if they contribute to the second one. This indication is needed in order to decide if an item should be taken into account in the interpretation as its position on the chart is not enough to decide this. Lastly, items are represented thanks to triangles whose proportion is relative to the number of cases.
CHART 3 ABOUT HERE
On the chart, the « very » items -"very attached to", "very proud of a territorial level of belonging" -are very close to one another, more so than the other series -the "fairly", "not very" and "not at all" answers. This means that there is a strong cumulative tendency with these items which is less the case for the other categories. Therefore, respondents who say they feel "very attached to" or "very proud of" one of their territorial communities are likely to feel "very attached to" or "very proud of" their other territorial communities too. So if someone says they are very proud of their nation, they are likely to feel very proud of being European too, and likely to feel very attached not only to their nation, but to Europe, their region and town also. If they answer that they feel "fairly "or not very proud" of their nation, the answers regarding the other questions, and more specifically Europe, are less predictable.
The first factor opposes the "very" items concerning all levels of identification, to the "fairly" and "not very" items corresponding to the national and sub-national levels only. Not only does this factor oppose strong positive identification to answers with less intensity, but it opposes a European, national and sub-national nested identification to national and subnational cumulative belonging which does not include Europe.
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The second factor is more complicated in that it opposes the "fairly attached to" and "fairly proud of" Europe and the nation, as well as what we have called Euronationals 20 , to two series of items: on one hand, the item "national only" and on the other hand, the items "not at all attached to" and "not at all proud of Europe" and "not very attached to the country". The combination Europe/nation is thus opposed to two different attitudes: on one hand, an exclusive attachment to the nation and on the other hand, a rejection of identification which is more pronounced vis-à-vis Europe than the nation. However, respondents who declare that they are not at all proud of their nation are actually quite rare in Eurobarometer surveys.
These results confirm the first factor analysis, with the same mix of cumulative and exclusive identification. They provide a more complex picture of the possible combinations of identifications although the novelty of identification with Europe plays an important part in the pattern. The first factor corresponds to the process of identification with any available territorial community. Respondents who have a strong tendency to identify with one of them are thus likely to identify with any other, including Europe while those who do not tend to identify strongly with traditional levels of belonging do not display the same tendency to project themselves in newly available levels of citizenry. Indeed, feeling "very" attached or proud corresponds to a different process than less intense feelings of belonging (Duchesne & Frognier, 1995 ).
It is not surprising then that "very" items do not load on the second factor. The second factor accounts for the competitive process of identification with different potential sovereign territories and more particularly for the competition between the new European polity and older national and even more sub-national political communities.
This analysis therefore provides clear evidence of the complex combination of territorial attachments that result from the dual process of identification with a political community, 
CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to make sense of the paradoxical statistical relationship between indicators of attachment to Europe and its nations. In the literature, some authors comment on a negative relationship which they consider to be a sign of persistent nationalistic feelings while others observe a positive relationship which they interpret as the consequence of the complex nature of identities -nested, marbled, or multidimensional.
We would argue that European identity should not be considered as a fact. Instead, attachment to Europe should rather be analyzed as a process, a process of identification with a new, growing potential political community 21 . As a consequence, we have proceeded to a diachronic analysis of indicators of attachment to any territorial levels, using Eurobarometer data sets. This shows over time that identification with Europe is directly related to national identification, and that the relationship established between these two types of identification is consistent, despite the fact that it changes according to the context. The changes observed can be interpreted as a consequence of the duality of the process of identification with territorial political communities.
On one hand, identification is a process which results from the sociologically and politically determined individual disposition to feel like a member of a community, that is, to feel subjectively involved in the community or groups to which one objectively belongs. In this respect, nations still appear to be a powerful vehicle for the development of such a tendency towards a we-feeling which, in particular, can then be extended to other nested territories such as the European Union. On the other hand, identification results from the sociological and political process of community building which is made easier by the limitation of the community, and is hence fuelled by pointing out some significant "other" such as the European Union. In the short term, the exclusive dimension is a direct consequence of the actions of national leaders who endeavor to preserve their power and decision-making space.
These two processes of national and European identification interact in such a way that the relationship between these two levels of identification is often difficult to spot. From 1994 to 2000, it seems possible to trace the effect of European electoral campaigns or other specific public debate on the EU. In such periods, the relationship between the indicators of European and national identification become significantly negative, while outside of these periods, the relationship is weaker or non significant. In these periods of public debate on the EU, the arguments of national anti-European activists activate potential antagonism between Europe and its nations. Between 1994 and 2000, the only available variable to measure European identification is a question which implies competition between the two levels of belonging. 
